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About the Publishers

These books were produced in conjunction with a conference titled ‘Acknowledging a Shared Past to Build a Shared Future: Rethinking Muslim/non-Muslim Relations’, convened at the University of Cambridge in March 2012 by the following partners:

British Council
The British Council is the UK’s international organisation for educational opportunities and cultural relations. We create international opportunities for the people of the UK and other countries and build trust between them worldwide. We work in over 100 countries in the arts, education, society and English. The Our Shared Future project, based in the US, aims to improve the public conversation about Muslims and intercultural relations in the US and Europe. Our Shared Future is supported in large part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The related Our Shared Europe project, a partner in convening the conference held in Cambridge, creates opportunities to discuss and share perspectives on diversity, migration, community cohesion, inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogue in contemporary Europe.

HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge
The Centre of Islamic Studies is at the forefront of research and public engagement on the role of Islam in wider society. Working with partners across the University of Cambridge and beyond, from academic institutes to civil society organisations and the government, the Centre has developed a reputation for enriching public debate and knowledge through high-profile and innovative research projects about Islam in the UK, Europe and globally.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1
Executive Summary 2
Mongrel history by Dr Caroline Finkel 4
Multiculturalism in the UK by Mohammed Abdul Aziz 6
The recognition of culture and religion in the European public sphere by S. M. Atif Intiaz 9
Rethinking multiculturalism in an age of austerity by Shana Cohen 11
Rethinking issues of identity and citizenship in Muslim/non-Muslim relations by Mark Sedgwick 13
Engaging pluralism: Civil society and service by Zahra N. Jamal, Ph.D 15
Religion, open and closed collective identities by Hassan Rachik 17
Citizenship and identity through the lens of Islamic marriage and divorce by Dr J. Macfarlane 19
Integration as interaction by Nagihan Haliloglu 22
Two languages: Reflections on calibrating citizenship and religio-cultural identities by Farid Panjawani 24
Semantics of the ‘actual’ Islam by Riem Spielhaus 26
Questions regarding the identity and social participation of Muslims in Germany by Prof Dr Havva Engin 29
Endnotes 32
IT’S TIME TO FILL THE GAP BETWEEN ACADEMIC EXPERTISE AND PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF MUSLIMS AND ISLAM.
During the last decade, debates on the role of religion in the public space, migration, social cohesion and other issues have revealed increasing social tensions and polarisation in public opinion. Misperceptions and misinformation often dominate public dialogue about relations between Muslims and others. Although they don’t speak with the loudest voice, academics, scholars and thought leaders have a key role to play in helping to rebalance these debates by providing fact-based opinion and informed arguments.

In March 2012, the Our Shared Future and Our Shared Europe programmes in the British Council and the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies (CIS) at the University of Cambridge invited seventy scholars, civil society leaders, journalists and other influencers to the University’s Møller Centre for three days of discussion, training, and collaboration in a conference titled ‘Acknowledging a Shared Past to Build a Shared Future: Rethinking Muslim/non-Muslim Relations’.

One of the key objectives of this conference was to help fill the gap between academic expertise and public knowledge of cross-cultural relations involving Muslims. Participants broke into discussion groups around five themes to pinpoint new, more inclusive narratives to reshape the conversation about intercultural relations. They explored areas of research and partnerships among institutions in the US, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa that can help shed light on deep connections between Muslim and non-Muslim societies in the fields of culture, the arts, humanities and science. Rounding out these discussions, participants had the opportunity to work with media professionals to develop effective messaging and gain practical skills to improve their engagement with online, print and broadcast media.

The essays that follow reflect the ideas that participants arrived at the conference with as well as the conversations that ensued throughout its three days. We have produced four books covering each of the themes undertaken at Cambridge: The Power of Words and Images; Islam, Knowledge and Innovation; Citizenship and Identity; and Religion, Politics and the Public Sphere.

While those who came together in Cambridge strive to take forward the ideas and opportunities that arose from the conference, we invite our readers to take up new calls to action and engage in dialogue informed by the arguments set forth in the following pages. We owe deep gratitude to our partners in organising the conference: the Carnegie Corporation of New York; the Association of Muslim Social Scientists; the Woolf Institute and the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre for the Study of Islam in the Contemporary World at the University of Edinburgh.

To access the companion books in this series and explore further resources on improving the public conversation about civilisation, identity and religion, please visit www.oursharedfuture.org.

— Dr Emmanuel Kattan, Project and Partnerships Manager, Our Shared Future, British Council
— Prof Yasir Suleiman, Founding Director, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge

June 2012
Whether provoked by practices of religious observance in France or proposals to require citizenship tests for Arabs in Israel, questions of citizenship and identity have very real implications for twenty-first-century Muslims.

The working group focusing on Citizenship and Identity discussed two claims prevalent in recent public debates: that Muslims cannot be fully integrated into societies in which they are a minority population and that Muslim values and ideas are transforming traditional European and American principles. In both cases, publics have called for an urgent response to protect and preserve those ‘western’ cultures that are supposedly threatened by Islam.

In tackling these contentious claims, the working group addressed four questions:

• How do Muslim communities in Europe and the US contribute to creating diverse, dynamic and prosperous societies?

• What examples, drawn from shared historical experiences between Muslim and non-Muslim societies, can counter the perception that conquest and conflict are at the root of relations between the two?

• How can a fresh exploration of the exchange of ideas, artistic borrowings and mutual influence in the areas of science, social science and technology help outline a common sense of identity between Muslim and non-Muslim societies?

• How can we develop a notion of citizenship that encompasses diverse layers of identity and belonging?

The first conclusion in response to these questions was that viewing these issues through a binary lens of ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ contributed to the very problem it was intended to solve. Here, the participants embarked on an interesting process of setting to reframe the debate. According to many of their assertions, the debate is too often framed as ‘us vs. them’ when, as some of the papers examine, the reality on the ground is much different. This marks an important point in the discussion of how to relate to each other over cultural boundaries, and it is certainly an area of future research to be explored.

Perhaps the most important questions answered in the essays that follow are ones relating to how Muslims view themselves as members in these larger communities. In a binary discussion of ‘Muslims’ and ‘non-Muslims’, the Muslim community is portrayed as a homogenous group of people—when the truth is that there is a wide range of varying identities within the Muslim community. The following papers examine not only how the Muslim community sees itself within their own communities, but also how these views shape interaction with those in other communities. Julie Macfarlane’s paper focuses on her personal examination of the practice of marriage and divorce in North American Muslims, and this topic highlighted the varying interpretations of shari’a law among Muslims: ‘While the meaning of shari’a to American and Canadian Muslims is inevitably diverse, I did not meet anyone who wanted the extension of the most notorious penal regimes presented as mainstream “shari’a law” in western media’.

Caroline Finkel’s paper touches on our shared ‘Mongrel History’, which we do not always recognise. Finkel suggests, ‘Knowing that we are all the product of mixing allows us to escape from the fallacy into which we have boxed ourselves, and removes one significant barrier to accepting that everyone else is a lot like us’.
Zahra Jamal examines the role that civic society and service can play in improved cultural integration. Dr Jamal notes, ‘With 6–8 million Muslims in America and record numbers involved in civic service, the need to understand and engage this population in the face of increasing distrust and even hostility towards Islam is crucial’.

This summary, of course, only touches on a select few of the essays submitted by our conference participants. Throughout the collection, the authors also express an urgent need to amend both the terms of the debate and the debate itself to open up a more nuanced discussion. However, there remains optimism in these suggestions. There is a real chance to change this debate, and the following essays offer many intriguing insights on how to do so.

— Paul Newall, Project Assistant, Our Shared Future, British Council
MONGREL HISTORY

BY DR CAROLINE FINKEL

I am often reminded of a 2006 UK TV programme called 100% English. Eight white, English-raised people who consider themselves to be ‘pure Anglo-Saxon’ are DNA-tested to discover where their forebears came from. Predictably, they turn out to be mongrels: Among their ancestors are people from sub-Saharan Africa, south-east Europe and the Middle East. Some are not pleased with the result. One of the questions asked of them is how long their family would need to have been in England for them to be considered English. The answers range widely, including—if I remember correctly—‘from the Norman Conquest of 1066’ to ‘for two hundred years’.

This riveting programme demonstrates to me how wilful ignorance of the past enables the way we treat one another in the present to be determined by notions of purity and exclusivity. Learning about our individual and collective past, by contrast, allows us to escape the fallacy into which we have boxed ourselves and removes one significant barrier to accepting that everyone else is a lot like us. The knowledge that we are all the product of mixing offers a basis for emphasising what we share rather than what makes us different.

I am a historian of the Ottoman world, and I have spent much of my life in Turkey. This distance from my native land has shaped my perspective on history and world affairs. Turkey, the Balkans and the Middle East lie at the heart of my mental map, not ‘the West’, with the UK at the centre, as in the projection of the globe familiar to British people of my generation. Shifting one’s viewpoint in this way frees one to reject the polarising western narratives that allow no chance for peaceful interaction between people of diverse origins—in the present case, Muslims and non-Muslims.

Much of the history of Europe was made in productive dialogue with the history of the supposed Muslim ‘other’.1 When Britain was merely an inhospitable archipelago clinging to the edge of a continent—and America was still being ‘discovered’—the chattering classes looked to the sultan’s domains for inspiration as to how power might be exercised in society.

The Ottoman centuries were long—in some regions of the Balkans, the empire held sway for almost five hundred years—and geographically disparate. We have much to learn about how people of numerous ethnicities and diverse religious practices lived and worked together under Ottoman rule. A first step is to reject the default assumption that intercommunal life in Ottoman Europe was more violent than life in a non-Ottoman Europe irreconcilably riven by fine distinctions in the dogma of rival branches of Christianity.

We need to accept that people as well as goods have always flowed between east and west and that our history is not ‘ours’ alone but is shared.

Research on the Ottoman world is advancing rapidly, particularly thanks to the engagement of young scholars in the empire’s successor states, who are making up for lost time by inquiring into the disavowed centuries in their history. Rulers of the modern nation-states in the Balkans (as in the Middle East) have long preferred to ignore the Ottoman centuries and hark back to a supposedly untainted pre-Ottoman golden age. This is dangerous nonsense—as the wars in former Yugoslavia so murderously remind us. Half a millennium of history cannot be disregarded, and like people everywhere, the present-day inhabitants of the Balkans—most of which is now within the EU—are formed, for better or worse, by all eras of their past. This past cannot
be separated out into strands marked Christian, Jewish, Muslim and so on.

Yet despite much ‘new knowledge’ being available, non-specialists still trot out tired old stereotypes, revealing both their laziness in not troubling to read what is now available and their ideological position that ignores challenges to their preconceptions. Catch phrases—such as ‘clash of civilisations’—with obvious appeal to tabloid editors and many policy wonks, or What Went Wrong?, to quote the title of an all-too popular book on the later Ottoman empire, only obscure our understanding.

The older Muslim populations of Europe came with the Ottoman advance (and earlier) or converted centuries ago. The regions of Europe their descendants inhabit are as much theirs as they are ‘ours’. But what of migrations within our experience that brought south Asians to Britain, North Africans to France and Turks to Germany, for instance? The history curriculum in British schools famously dwells on Pharaohs and Nazis and barely teaches us even about our own empire—the upheavals and atrocities in the places we colonised, the riches we appropriated and the labour we needed back home to process these riches. I doubt that French or German schoolchildren are better informed. The stories of recent movements of people must be told if we are to understand how entwined our pasts are and the debts we owe each other.

Politicians, educators and the media have a crucial role in putting our present ills to rights, but the ‘tabloid agenda’ holds successive governments in thrall. Rather than accepting the empty rhetoric that passes for political debate on migration, and in particular accepting the vitriol so often directed at Muslims—who are typically regarded as a single, undifferentiated ‘problem’—opinion-makers both elected and unelected must embrace their responsibility to help us understand one another.

We need to accept that people as well as goods have always flowed between east and west and that our history is not ‘ours’ alone but is shared. And we need to realise that a shared past is far more interesting than the narrowly nationalist one we have constructed—as, of course, are a shared present and future. Models drawn from the past may offer clues to ways of living together that are more productive than those we hold up as immutable in the fractious present.

Europe has rarely been a tolerant place—it was, after all, the states of Western Europe that often expelled their religious minorities rather than the Ottomans. The values we today deem intrinsic are not so but have been hard-won over the centuries. We live in remarkable times, when the myth of western superiority can no longer be sustained, as new media give a voice to those who have been silenced. Double standards that the West has so long imposed are revealed for the confidence trick that the ‘people without history’ always knew them to be.

This is an opportune moment for us to listen to those reflexively branded ‘the other’. If we consider that the life into which we are born is a matter of serendipity—I could be s/he—empathy is the humane response. Turning to the question of citizenship—a warm welcome rather than a presumption of irreconcilable difference would be a good beginning.

Dr Caroline Finkel is an honorary fellow at the University of Edinburgh and University of Exeter.
MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UK

BY MOHAMMED ABDUL AZIZ

Multiculturalism was once much celebrated in many parts of the western world, especially the English-speaking world. Today, it is a much-soiled approach, publicly disowned by conservative governments in those same quarters. Governments in continental Europe, where it was not always as readily accepted as in English-speaking countries, have added their voices to this rejection of the approach. However, in this brief paper, I want to suggest that multiculturalism is now an embedded part of the UK’s unwritten constitution. By constitution here, I mean both the Capital ‘C’ Constitution (i.e. the collection of Acts of Parliament; institutional codes of practices; common law principles and customs, conventions and practices that govern the UK) and the small ‘c’ constitution (i.e. what actually makes up the UK today—its peoples, their characteristics and aspirations, and how they live together). I also want to suggest here that a ‘reclaimed’ understanding of multiculturalism, as embedded in our unwritten constitution, acknowledges a shared past and can help build a shared future towards a Greater Britain for all those that constitute Britain today.

But what is this ‘reclaimed understanding of multiculturalism’? Tariq Modood, in a beautifully written book on this issue, makes a distinction between the broader and narrower conceptions of multiculturalism. The broader conception is in reference to the new progressive politics of the 1960s and 1970s centred on the ‘politics of identity: being true to one’s nature or heritage and seeking with others of the same kind public recognition for one’s collectivity’. The narrower conception refers to a multiculturalism brought about ‘not so much by the emergence of a political movement but by a more fundamental movement of peoples. By immigration—specifically, the immigration from outside Europe, of non-White peoples into predominantly white countries’. I want to suggest that the drivers and movements that developed this broader conception from the post-war period to the late 1970s (and beyond, albeit under different language—politics of identity, equality, diversity, inclusion, pluralism, human rights etc.) have also embedded this conception into the unwritten (small c) constitution of the UK through a cultural revolution with lasting impact. Let me explain.

A ‘reclaimed’ understanding of multiculturalism, as embedded in our unwritten constitution, acknowledges a shared past and can help build a shared future towards a Greater Britain for all those that constitute Britain today.

The two World Wars in the first half of the twentieth century set into motion many drivers towards multiculturalism in the UK, but in my view, four of these were most pertinent: 1) the post-war rejection of biological determinism based purely on race/religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation or any other social characteristic; 2) the development of international standards and instruments of human rights; 3) the mass migration of people, from all corners of the world, to western economies; and 4) the impact of bringing-rights-home movements, such as the independence movements around the world and the Civil Rights Movement in the US, on Black communities in the UK. These drivers provided spirit and flesh to four key movements in the arena of the politics of identity and difference: race, gender, disability and sexual orientation—each undertaken by representatives of groups with very distinct social locations that had historically been neglected or suppressed.
These movements, working separately but converging in essence, developed in the UK the broader conception of multiculturalism, which we may characterise as follows:

1) The space to articulate the injustice or oppression experienced by certain social groups on grounds of identity and difference in a language understood and accepted by wider society.6,7

2) The view that such injustice or oppression has no place in a modern society and that society as a whole must commit to changing dominant patterns of thinking and behaviour that oppress certain groups8,9 — e.g. through the law, the education system and promotional work more generally.

3) The idea that groups should no longer be characterised by stigmatised by oppressive outsider accounts but be able to reclaim/redescribe the ways their distinctiveness is understood, which is more self-determined and authentic.10,11

4) The notion that if identity and difference should not be used for injustice or oppression, then neither should sameness and equality12 — this being a critique of the social ontology borne from the liberal political theory that citizens be conceptualised as essentially similar individuals.13

5) The demand that where the long histories of injustices and oppressions have left behind large legacies of structural economic and political disadvantages for certain social groups and their members, these need to be specifically addressed and tackled.14

It is this broader conception of multiculturalism, as evolved from the post-war drivers through certain significant social identity-based political movements, that led to the social and cultural revolution of the 1970s and the spirit of which has since, in turn, been embedded into the UK (small c) constitution, setting into motion many developments that would mature and reinforce its permanence over years to come.

The Thatcherite years sought to trim back this broader conception of multiculturalism and its embedding in the UK at the national level. Whilst it had some success in achieving this (for example, in overturning the embedding of multiculturalism in schools in the wake of the Swann Report through the Education Act 1988), multiculturalism nonetheless thrived in most of the metro/cosmopolitan parts of the UK, despite growing internal unease and fractionalisations. In the wake of the riots in Black neighbourhoods in the early 1980s, however, the Thatcherite years did leave behind one important legacy: the impetus for narrowing the wider conception of multiculturalism as above to a far more restricted conception relating only to that concerned with immigration. New Labour initially seemed to revert back to promoting the broader conception with full zeal. However, in light of the events of the Northern cities’ disturbances and the atrocities of 9/11 in the US in 2001, and then the atrocities in London on 7/7 in 2005, it too subsequently publicly disowned the growing narrower immigration-based conception of multiculturalism (particularly as it referred to Muslims). Critically, however, New Labour continued to embed the substance of the broader conception, even if disowning the label, into the unwritten (Capital C) Constitution over the course of its term in office. This is demonstrated by the following:

1) Changes in the law – Significant pieces of legislation of constitutional weight were introduced, e.g. the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010, that extended the number of identity-based social groups recognised and protected from injustice and oppression. The legislation is now a fertile ground to develop further common law principles that will further embed multiculturalism into the Constitution.

2) Institutional changes – Representation of the ‘constitutionally’ protected groups in the key institutions of the state was proactively increased, in one occasion by legislation (i.e. women in Parliament), but mostly through other measures of positive action. Further, various data-collection measures, either modified or newly introduced (for example, the Census, national surveys, the public sector equality duty and the equality/human rights state
of the nation triennial report), now ensure that deficits in these key institutions can be readily identified—not only in terms of representation but also in terms of service delivery. The key mechanisms for addressing these deficits, however, are not as strongly embedded as they could have been—and there is already much evidence that they are being rolled back by the current Coalition government.

3) Policies and practices – In addition to the above, the recognition and representation of ‘constitutionally’ protected groups has been embedded into symbolic state events; for example, Remembrance Sunday and royal celebrations and the funding of group-specific facilities (e.g. faith schools) and group-specific needs (e.g. chaplaincy) within the mainstream framework.

A ‘reclaimed’ understanding of multiculturalism, as embedded in our unwritten constitution, acknowledges a shared past and can help build a shared future towards a Greater Britain for all those that constitute Britain today.

Despite this embedding of the substance of the broader conception of multiculturalism into the very constitution of the UK in both its meanings, efforts to narrow the scope of the term ‘multiculturalism’ to immigrant communities, particularly Muslim communities, continue. In this effort, the excesses and extremes of this narrower conception are then held up as the result of multiculturalism per se with a view to denying the benefits of our constitutional multiculturalism to the constituents of this narrower conception. Muslim communities appear to be a particular target of this approach. Our key argument here is, therefore, that where Muslims have been both contributors to and key beneficiaries of the broader conception of multiculturalism, they should resist this narrower conception and the sinister agenda it represents. We suggest that UK Muslims should instead contribute to co-ordinated efforts to reclaim and revitalise the broader conception of multiculturalism in public and popular discourses—the stronger the broader conception in such discourses, the more secure it is in our unwritten constitution. It also follows that the more secure it is in our constitution, the easier it becomes to build a shared future based on this, on our shared past. This reclaimed understanding of multiculturalism by UK Muslims and their co-citizens can then also address many of the issues raised under the theme here of citizenship and identity: conflict of cultures (values, beliefs and ways of life) between Islam/Muslims and the West, the difficulties of integration, the threat of Islamisation, the lack of community cohesion and the possibilities of public disorder and breaches of national security.

— Mohammed Abdul Aziz is a visiting fellow at the Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge.
THE RECOGNITION OF CULTURE AND RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

BY S. M. ATIF IMTIAZ

There is an assumption in some circles that multiculturalism has failed as public policy. This statement is too cumbersome to be of any practical use. It does not identify ways in which multiculturalism operates at the public-policy level. It also does not disaggregate the demands from Muslim communities for cultural and religious recognition. This short paper will consider ways in which this discussion can be improved by recognising different categories of demands from Muslim communities and different categories of responses from government.

First of all, it is important to recognise the limitations of the statement ‘multiculturalism has failed’. This is essentially a statement that is making a historical point; that is, that multiculturalism was adopted in the recent past as state policy by the governments of the United Kingdom and Germany, for example. It is considered that this policy helped increase tendencies towards segregation and ghettoisation in Muslim communities and that it must now be shelved as state policy. The analysis is weak and the judgement premature, because it is unclear if multiculturalism was ever adopted in a substantial manner by state policy. Have we ever been multicultural? And has equality been achieved in political representation, employment in public services and institutional delivery of services?

Instead, this paper will argue that it is necessary to distinguish between requests or demands for cultural recognition by religious minorities and the responses to such requests or demands.

A typology of requests and demands

There are essentially two sources of requests and demands by Muslim communities. The first is from Sacred law. The second is from identity politics.

From Sacred law, there are five categories for moral actions: obligatory, recommended, inconsequential, disliked and prohibited. ‘Multicultural problems’ occur when an action that is forbidden by Sacred law is made obligatory by working practice or school convention (if we consider the workplace and the school as two environments in which such encounters occur) (these kinds of problems tend to be rare) or when an action that is obligatory by Sacred law is made forbidden by working practice or school convention. For example, a fourteen-year-old may view her wearing the hijab as obligatory; however, the school could consider it forbidden. These kinds of problems tend to be more common.

According to identity politics, there are three sources of religious recognition. The first is the request or demand to be free in cultural terms—that is, from stigma and cultural devaluation. The second is the request or demand to be equal in socio-economic terms—that is, equal in employment and educational achievement. The third is the request or demand to be equal in representational terms—that is, in political representation.

A typology of state responses

There is a fivefold typology to state-level responses. This is in contrast to a bipolar model that characterises state responses as either inclusivist or rejectionist. This typology distinguishes between cultural recognition that is necessary, cultural recognition that is regarded as useful but not necessary, cultural recognition that is regarded as inconsequential, cultural
recognition that is regarded as objectionable but not illegal and finally culturally recognition that is regarded as illegal.

There are other ways in which the form of cultural recognition can be characterised: namely, as positive or negative and as informal or formal. For example, a government policy may decide that it must consider ethnic variations in diet in order to help provide preventative diabetes programmes. It may also decide to set up a forced marriage unit within a government department. The first is an example of a positive recognition of culture and the second a negative recognition of culture. The banning of the niqab in France is an example of a negative recognition of cultural diversity that makes the wearing of the niqab illegal.

There are clearly scenarios though in which multicultural discord is possible, likely or inevitable. In these situations, it is important to have leaderships developed and trained that are skilled in negotiation and community engagement. These leaders would be able to diffuse the situation through clearing up misunderstandings, renegotiating bottom lines and securing creative resolutions. There should also be an acceptance that some discordant situations may remain unresolvable, and an acceptance of an imperfect and unsatisfactory outcome for either side may be necessary. This would not detract from an understanding that all other multicultural encounters—and these form the overwhelming majority of encounters—remain functional, mutually advantageous and/or worthwhile.

Imagining the multicultural future
The great challenge for the future of many western cities in Europe and the United States of America will be the changing demographic. Already, many of the most important European cities have sizeable Muslim populations: Berlin, Paris, London, Amsterdam and Frankfurt. The question of the recognition of religious diversity is not going to disappear. What will be required is a framework of understanding that enables conflict resolution through an accurate understanding of the problem itself and the scale of the problem. It will also require a leadership that is familiar with this understanding and the techniques and tools required to help navigate communities through moments when multicultural discord could threaten social harmony.

— S. M. Atif Imtiaz is the academic director of Cambridge Muslim College.
RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

BY SHANA COHEN

This paper suggests that multiculturalism, in its broadest sense of recognising difference, could become a reference for community survival and moral authority in a period of economic duress and the retreat of the State from social intervention. Multiculturalism would thus go beyond the conventional understanding of regulating and accepting diversity within a liberal democracy. Instead, multiculturalism signifies a shift in the language and methods used in providing support to vulnerable groups; namely, away from government discourse and policy toward culturally and religiously based values and practices. Such a shift would mean that multiculturalism—while still relevant politically for debates over rights, citizenship and cultural relativism—now represents a mode and space of mobilisation to manage economic insecurity and overcome social alienation in global market capitalism.

Based on qualitative research conducted in England, the paper compares how managers and staff of voluntary sector organisations reflect upon their work and related problems and obstacles in 2005-07, or prior to the financial crisis, and then in 2010-11, or after the crisis and the imposition of the austerity budget. The organisations interviewed in the earlier period were located in Sheffield and in 2011, Manchester, but all in areas of relatively high deprivation.

Under the Labour government, or during the earlier period of research, enthusiastic support displayed by the government for Third Sector activities and for the ‘empowerment’ of communities through running services and political participation (see the 2008 White Paper ‘Communities in Control’) masked the bureaucratisation of voluntary action and the perpetuation of the lopsided power relationship between the two sectors. The consequence of the managerial focus was to frame social action within socio-structural terms, or primarily as class formation and class relations.

David Cameron, the current British Prime Minister, has promoted the rhetoric of a ‘Big Society’ replacing public services and pushed an agenda of localism to replace centralised authority. Cameron himself defines the ‘Big Society’ as ‘a bigger, stronger, more active society’ that ‘involves something of a revolt against the top-down, statist approach of recent years’. In the absence of a clear policy strategy behind the ‘Big Society’ initiative, Third Sector organisations have proffered their own definitions. One manager of a support centre within an area of Manchester with a population of largely Pakistani origin told me, ‘For me, the Big Society is about communities living in harmony with less crime. But also about poverty. We need tools for local government to use to integrate multiple communities. Maybe BME [Black Minority Ethnic] communities are trying to integrate but other communities have to be interested’.

Remarking that his own organisation provides a ‘comfort zone’ for service users, he complained, ‘The money for English Language is going to be cut. Now it is going to be linked to benefits so women who are not working won’t be taking classes. They will have to be on JSA. I think that is such a wrong policy. This is not about localism, big society, or inclusion... There is a big gap in the NHS. They use a general language where they need to have a faith-based angle. They will get greater buy-in with rabbis and imams’. He then stressed that to be effective, services needed to integrate cultural and religious needs into public assistance:
Services really need to have a faith element. The language needs to change. A number of people will go to the Imam but they are not skilled to deal with trauma. There is a gap in services. I think domestic violence is even higher than reported. With joblessness, it is not special language that is the issue but rather that they are comfortable in their environment they are in . . . If you have general services, they won’t be accessible. The orthodox [Jews] won’t access them for religious reasons and the BME because of language.

Though the coalition government has slashed funding to the voluntary sector, they have also left open the meaning and practice of frequently used policy terms like ‘empowerment’ and ‘community’. Criticising banning the veil in France, cites the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy on community, writing that the essence of community is ‘being-in-common’ between individuals who are different. This understanding of community, Scott argues, negates the universalism expounded by politicians and points to solidarity in diversity.

Talal Asad defines a ‘secular society’ as ‘a modern construct based on the legal distinction between public and private, on a political arrangement requiring “religion” to be subjected by law to the private domain, on an ideology of moral individualism and a downgrading of the knowing subject’ (2001: 1). Perhaps community responses to the stark consequences of austerity and recession are blurring these distinctions in the name of preserving the social and economic basis of democracy itself.

— Shana Cohen is a fellow at the Woolf Institute.

Community organisations of different faiths and ethnic backgrounds are potentially providing a space where moral values, subjective motivation to ‘do good’, social relations and social welfare are interlinked.

What will solidarity mean, politically, in reference to multiculturalism particularly and more generally market-oriented policies driven by budget cuts and limitations on the scope of State providence? Certainly, community- and faith-based organisations lack the political power and scope of services of national organisations and private companies engaged in social care, especially those managing programmes commissioned by the government. Yet the national programmes often rely on local social action to address complex cases or even perform the basic service. Through their local importance, particularly in relation to growing material need and demand for support, community organisations of different faiths and ethnic backgrounds are potentially providing a space where moral values, subjective motivation to ‘do good’, social relations and social welfare are interlinked in distinction to both modern conceptions of the State and market absolutism.

What will solidarity mean, politically, in reference to multiculturalism particularly and more generally market-oriented policies driven by budget cuts and limitations on the scope of State providence? Certainly, community- and faith-based organisations lack the political power and scope of services of national organisations and private companies engaged in social care, especially those managing programmes commissioned by the government. Yet the national programmes often rely on local social action to address complex cases or even perform the basic service. Through their local importance, particularly in relation to growing material need and demand for support, community organisations of different faiths and ethnic backgrounds are potentially providing a space where moral values, subjective motivation to ‘do good’, social relations and social welfare are interlinked in distinction to both modern conceptions of the State and market absolutism. Talal Asad defines a ‘secular society’ as ‘a modern construct based on the legal distinction between public and private, on a political arrangement requiring “religion” to be subjected by law to the private domain, on an ideology of moral individualism and a downgrading of the knowing subject’ (2001: 1). Perhaps community responses to the stark consequences of austerity and recession are blurring these distinctions in the name of preserving the social and economic basis of democracy itself.

— Shana Cohen is a fellow at the Woolf Institute.
It is no longer enough for those wishing to further good relations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Europe and the US to assert that (as the framework document notes) ‘pluralistic societies thrive on diverse sources of cultural influence’ and ‘diversity reinforces a community’s social fabric and helps societies adapt and reinvent themselves’. Whether or not this is true, the words ‘pluralistic’ and ‘diverse’ do not have the same positive value for all groups in Western Europe. For substantial numbers of Western Europeans, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘diverse’ are terms that have acquired strongly negative associations. Pluralism and diversity are seen as being forced on unwilling populations by an out-of-touch, naïve and perhaps even malevolent cultural and political elite. Hostility towards this elite contributes to hostility towards Muslims. Arguments couched in terms of pluralism and diversity, then, risk convincing only those who are already convinced—in both directions.

Even the arguments from economic benefits that are frequently made are of limited use in Europe. In a US context, it can be argued that Muslim communities contribute to creating diverse, dynamic and prosperous societies. This is more difficult in Europe, as the socio-economic profile of Muslim communities there differs significantly from that of such communities in the US. In a European context, Muslims are often seen as threatening the welfare (social security) benefits of the non-Muslim population by absorbing a disproportionate share of government spending. This perception has some basis in fact but misses the more important point, which is that the real threat to welfare benefits has nothing to do with Muslims and comes instead from non-Muslim demographics, from the need to adjust to economic competition from outside Europe as a result of globalisation, and—more recently—from global financial markets.

Arguments couched in terms of the innate value of pluralism and diversity, then, have little power with significant sections of Western European populations, and arguments couched in economic terms run into difficulties, especially in Europe. Further, neither variety of argument has any power against widespread but inaccurate perceptions that conquest and conflict are at the root of relations between the two cultures.

For substantial numbers of Western Europeans, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘diverse’ are terms that have acquired strongly negative associations.

Conquest and conflict have indeed often been an important element in relations between Muslim and non-Muslim states, but the same is true of relations between all varieties of state. During recent centuries, wars between non-Muslim states have caused the most suffering of all, followed by wars between Muslim states; wars between non-Muslim and Muslim states come a very distant third. Non-Muslim and Muslim states in fact share the historical experience of alliances that ignore confessional lines. Turkey fought alongside America and Britain during the Korean War. The Ottoman Empire fought the Russian Empire first in alliance with Britain and then in alliance with Germany. Before this, France enlisted Ottoman support in its long-running rivalry with the Habsburg Empire. Even in the more distant past, Christian sometimes
fought Christian during the Crusades, during which Muslim sometimes (though less frequently) fought Muslim.

Muslim and non-Muslim peoples also have a shared history of internal struggle with some of their own regimes. Since the end of the Second World War, the need to restrain state and government to secure the individual has been almost universally accepted in the West, but the over-mighty centralised state and then the totalitarian state were both originally European inventions. First centralised and then totalitarian states were established in the Arab world on European models. The experience of many Muslim peoples, then, has been the same as the experience of many non-Muslim European peoples—just slightly later. Turkey, however, established a single-party state at about the time Fascist Italy did and dismantled it voluntarily, not as a consequence of military defeat, establishing a working democracy earlier than Spain did.

Shared experience goes beyond these areas. In the medieval period, for example, science was a branch of philosophy, and Arab and Latin philosophy formed a single whole. Both Muslim and Jewish philosophers who wrote in Arabic were translated into Latin and found on the obligatory curriculums of studies in Paris and elsewhere. Both Arab and Latin philosophy drew on Aristotle, Plato and Neoplatonism, and both faced the same problems of adapting ancient philosophy to monotheistic religious systems.

Later periods saw a reverse of the medieval situation when Europe absorbed scientific and medical discoveries from the Arabic-speaking world (from Jewish-Arabs as well as Muslim-Arabs). In recent centuries, the massive economic resources required for the production of science and technology have been in the West, and it is only Muslim scientists working in the West who have had the opportunity to collect Nobel Prizes. Only in the religious sphere has there been recent transfer from the Muslim world to the West, with Goethe enthusing about Sufi poetry and nineteenth-century America reading the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám and featuring Sufis in musicals. This transfer continues in a less dramatic form even today. Sufi poetry is still much read in the West, though poetry as a whole is of course less read than it was in the nineteenth century, and Doris Lessing, winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize for Literature, describes herself as a Sufi.

In the end, though, identities are adopted in complex fashions, and it is important to stress that citizenship is, at root, a political concept. The original perception was that sovereignty belonged to the people by natural right, not to a monarch by divine right. This original perception was then complicated by Romantic conceptions of national identity deriving from blood, soil and language. Many difficulties would be avoided if the original political conception were restored and political rights and functions separated from mythical identities.

— Mark Sedgwick is a professor at Aarhus University, Denmark.
Pluralism, religious freedom and volunteering are as central to American public life as they are to Islamic beliefs, practices and notions of civic engagement. There is a rich historic tradition of service, civil society and sound governance in Muslim societies that emphasises communal obligations to improve the quality of life of concerned peoples. American Muslims have institutionalised and refashioned this ethos in the American context in the last several decades. Yet there exists a pervasive ‘clash of ignorance’ wherein educational systems and media outlets among Westerners as well as Muslims (in the US and abroad) have failed to educate each about ‘the other’ and have neglected a long history of respect and cooperation between Muslims and Westerners, and their respective civilisations, as well as the immense diversity of interpretation and social and ethical practices that mark each set of societies.

With between two and ten million Muslims in America and record numbers involved in civic service, the need to understand and engage this population in the face of increasing distrust and even hostility towards Islam is crucial. While the Bush and Obama administrations have highlighted Islam as a faith of peace and Muslims in America as peaceful citizens, laws and policies passed and supported under their administrations over (Muslim) charitable giving, wire-tapping, surveillance, involuntary registration of men from Muslim majority countries and so on illustrate the ambiguous place of Muslims in America. Indeed, although 88% of Americans agree that religious freedom should be guaranteed to all citizens, 47% of Americans say that Islamic values are at odds with American values. 45% are uncomfortable with public acts demonstrating one’s Muslim identity and nearly 30% of voters do not believe Muslims should be eligible to sit on the US Supreme Court or run for president.

The impacts are stark: The FBI announced in the fall of 2011 that anti-Muslim hate crimes had risen 50%. Unsurprisingly, 55% of American Muslims believe their lives have become more difficult since 9/11. For example, though American Muslims constitute only 2% of the workforce, they comprise 25% of workplace discrimination claims on the basis of religion. The surveillance of Muslim university students by government agencies has recently surfaced as a matter for public concern, the effects of which on Muslims’ educational experience remains to be seen.

Service and civic engagement can forge a positive, healthy, productive and actionable approach to teaching pluralism and putting it into action and serve as a compelling way of broaching expressions of Islamophobia that currently mar the US and much of the western world. While voluntary service connotes active citizenship and is oft deemed an American phenomenon, it is not simply a civic right, but also a religious right for many Muslims. Given their rich civically engaged work, American Muslims can facilitate the nation’s domestic and foreign policies particularly with respect to Muslim-majority countries. The opportunity is to engage and learn from this segment not simply as contributing American citizens and foreign nationals vital to the national social fabric of diversity and religious tolerance but also as Muslim civic leaders who could support their homelands in the crucial political transition to more tolerant Islamic democracies. As well, because the roles of Muslim women are generally limited in religious leadership but expansive in civic leadership, they can play a larger role in transnational networks and policy-related fora.
Voluntary service and civic engagement can also be leveraged as the:

1) common linchpin for inter- and intra-faith (intra-Muslim) dialogue and action on common practices and goals with culturally specific meanings for different communities;

2) basis for service learning in education sectors, from early childhood through post-graduate level, as a means to study, teach, engage and enact pluralism in its many forms (racial, religious, gendered, ethical etc.);

3) key to cross-sectoral partnerships facing economic and other resource constraints in addressing common issues such as quality of life, social harmony, environmental degradation, early childhood development and gender equity in the US and in Muslim societies abroad and

4) means by which policymakers and influencers among Americans, American Muslims and Muslims abroad learn about and engage with one another to foster mutual understanding and cooperation.

Critical to this process is the need to strengthen programmes and policies accommodating difference to enhance civil society. Such policies would cultivate the equal participation of all people in civic life and would call on individuals to retain their cultural, linguistic and religious heritage within a framework of shared citizenship. A series of convenings among change-enablers and opinion-makers such as legislators, policymakers, educators, researchers, development practitioners, journalists, activists and advocates from different sectors is important to:

1) develop practical ideas and means to strengthen forms of associational life dedicated to the common good;

2) empower citizens through collective participation and stewardship of shared resources;

3) encourage democratic engagement in society through enhanced platforms and networks for civic discourse and through the promotion of responsible and informed media and

4) support an enabling regulatory environment supporting the conditions in which civil society organisations can operate and thrive.

The civic engagement of all citizens is critical to enhancing the practice of shared values of peace, tolerance, social justice and generosity that underpin democracy at home and abroad. In this process, American Muslims have so much to contribute as valued citizens with multiple connections to hostlands, homelands and transnational networks through which they have historically given back as civically engaged peoples.

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RELIGION, OPEN AND CLOSED COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

BY HASSAN RACHIK

Collective identities are usually approached in terms of their content (religious, linguistic, cultural...): Christian, Muslim, Arab etc. The importance of the ideological content is undeniable, but I think that we should also pay more attention to the forms and the logics of collective identities. To put it simply, diverse and even opposite ideological conceptions of identities may share common features: totalitarian, closed, exclusive and purist conceptions of identity vs. selective, open, cumulative and plural.

Intellectuals and people face the question of hierarchy and conflict of loyalties.

The closed identity is a form of identity that excludes any relation with neighbouring identities. No relationship can be envisaged between two identities. One cannot belong to more than one identity at the same time. To adopt a new identity, one must abandon his/her original community. This is what usually happens within religious conversions. It may also happen within the same religious community. For instance, some Muslim ideologists contend that the Muslim identity should not be mixed with other national or ethnic identities. According to them, a Muslim should only stress his/her religious identity and negate all neighbouring identities. No one should claim that s/he is a Moroccan Muslim, Arab Muslim, English Muslim or Kurdish Muslim, for example. Most radical ideologies are based on the exclusion of any neighbouring identity. To them, a Muslim should show an exclusive loyalty to his/her religion.

Being exclusively a Muslim is an ideal that was first proposed by some Salafist ideologists.

Jamal al-Dine al-Afghani wrote, at the end of the nineteenth century, that whatever their countries, Muslims who are impregnated by their religion reject their nationalities (al-jinciyate) and their people (cha’b). They refuse any type of solidarity (açabiya) except the Islamic solidarity (al-uçba al-islamiya). There is one loyalty, one solidarity that should be based on a general connection, and this general connection, according to al-Afghani, is the relation between Muslims as believers. The only link between Muslims is religion (jami’at al-dine). That’s why the Arabs did not deny the authority of the Turkish, and the Persians accepted the Arab sovereignty. They did not pay attention to the nationality (jinse) of the ruler; the essential condition is that the ruler applies the religious law.

In contrast to a closed Muslim identity, moderate ideologies value other neighbouring identities. In this case, we are more or less close to what are called hyphen identities. Muhammad Abdoh (1849–1905), a famous disciple of Jamal al-Dine al-Afghani, valued the idea of the homeland (al-Watan) defined as a political space where one can have rights and be safe. Other Salafist thinkers defend the same idea. According to Rachid Rida (1865–1935), a disciple of Muhammad Abdoh, nationalism does not contradict Islam. Moreover, he defined nationalism as the union of the inhabitants of a country that belong to different religions and cooperate to defend their homeland.

In the case of open and plural identities, intellectuals and people face the question of hierarchy and conflict of loyalties. Here, most Salafist intellectuals consider that the religious link is stronger than those based on the nation or the language. I think that the religious radicalisation of the Salafi movement didn’t affect the conception of Muslim identity, which
remained in general open and plural. Many Salafi intellectuals valued the continuity between being Muslim and being a member of a nation.

I suppose that the great turn in the conception of Muslim identity has been favoured by the massive access to religious scriptures. Traditionally, this access was restricted to a set of established interpreters (âlîms, doctors). After the first waves of Salafism, the monopoly of religious interpretation was seriously challenged by new categories of interpreters. The passage from the status of the theologian to that of the intellectual affected the ideologisation of Islam. The new Muslim ideologists, by contrast to traditional religious learned men (âlîm, faqîh), are mostly not trained religious experts. Most of them were trained in the humanities or ‘hard’ sciences.

Classical Salafists were mostly religious radicals, whereas the famous ideologists of the following generation were political radicals. The politically radical ideologies tend to stress a closed conception of identity, rejecting the western institutions and the western way of life in general. The first reformist ideas based on the compromise and the adaptation to western civilisation were abandoned. It is this systematic rejection of western values that orients the new radical ideologies.

Currently, the continuity between national identity and Muslim identity is challenged by new closed conceptions of Muslim identity. Some ideologies impose on their followers to assert only the Muslim identity and ask them to undermine and revoke their commitment to the idea of the nation and citizenship presented as a creation of western colonisation. For these kinds of ideologies, the notions of citizenship, nation, homeland and patriotism are meaningless. Despite their marginality, these conceptions are worth exploring. We may find them frequently on the web. Their style is very concise, very apodictic and less argumentative. Their promoters need few ideas, few slogans and few emblems.

— Hassan Rachik is a professor at Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco.
Citizenship and identity through the lens of Islamic marriage and divorce

By Dr Julie Macfarlane

Over the past twenty years, I have studied many phenomena within both the justice system and ‘private ordering’ systems of informal justice. My study of the practice of Islamic marriage and divorce in North America was the first time I explored justice practices within Islam. The journey of this qualitative research project (2006–2010) was an extraordinary intellectual experience for me. The fact that misapprehensions about Islam are widespread, uniform even, was demonstrated in the continuous critical comments of colleagues, friends, students—indeed, virtually every non-Muslim to whom I have tried to explain my project. Six years on, I confess I am still astounded at the primitive ignorance that characterises almost every discourse—in the media, among academics, in the classroom and at the dinner tables of family and friends.

I conducted 212 in-depth interviews conducted with imams, religious scholars, social workers, therapists and marriage counsellors, lawyers and ordinary Muslim men and women who have been divorced. The demographics of my sample are broadly representative of the breakdown of Islamic ethnic groups within the North American Muslim population and reflect the proportion of first-generation immigrants and those born in the US or Canada (75/25%). The results of my study are both clear and simple and the data remarkably consistent. While the meaning of shari‘a to American and Canadian Muslims is inevitably diverse, I did not meet anyone who wanted the extension of the most notorious penal regimes presented as mainstream ‘shari‘a law’ (sic) in western media. Instead, aside from traditional religious observances, one of the most widely practiced aspects of shari‘a among North American Muslims is observation of Muslim marriage and divorce customs. In practical terms, this means that the bride and groom will sign a Muslim marriage contract (a nikah) as part of their civil ceremony, and if they decide to divorce, they may ask an imam or religious leader to ‘approve’ their divorce either before or after they obtain a civil decree.

It is unsurprising to find that Canadian and American Muslims, as relative newcomers in North America, sometimes assert their religious and cultural identity by drawing boundaries and creating ‘insider’ spaces that allow for the continuation of special customs and symbolic cultural rituals. As one imam put it, ‘Muslim communities in the West . . . are still captive to the traditions back home. They have one foot in North America and one foot in the air’. An Islamic identity is most typically defined in terms of Muslim family life, including, for example, a preference for finding a marriage partner within the community, a continuing role for parents and in-laws in the life of newly married couples and recourse to traditional rituals of Islamic marriage and divorce. There are some signs that this affirmation of identity has become more pronounced in the face of public hostility since 9/11. Many Muslims who are not formally observant turn to shari‘a to mark life’s most important passages: birth, marriage, divorce and death. In the words of one young woman raised in North America, ‘It doesn’t matter how North American you are; it still matters so much to us that we do Islamic marriage and divorce. Even second- and third-generation immigrants, you always have your foot in your parents’ hang-ups however westernised you are’.

The idea of imposing shari‘a—a private obligation to God—via law on non-Muslims is nonsensical
to Muslims. The dramatic warnings that ‘Shari’ā Law is Coming’ posted on America’s highways are based in neither fact (it is not—US and Canadian courts do not recognise or apply shari’a) nor aspiration (just three of the forty-two imams in the sample expressed any interest in legal recognition of a parallel Muslim family law system, despite the attention given to this idea by some media and policymakers). Instead, the respondents in my study understand their private choices of Islamic marriage and divorce as separate from the formal legal system. They regard their respect for ‘God’s law’ as a matter for their personal conscience rather than public adjudication. Far from proposing to replace ‘state law’ with God’s law—respondents were emphatic that Muslims are obliged to obey the law of the land—almost every respondent married and divorced ‘twice’: once in Islam and once in the legal system (by obtaining a marriage licence or a divorce decree from a family court).

The study data also exposes the groundlessness of the assertion that North American Muslims are choosing their faith over their citizenship loyalties. Many respondents asserted strong parallel loyalty to their faith, their culture and their citizenship, seeing no incompatibility. ‘I love America . . . but I love to see always to see the right way in Islam. It is possible to hold loyalty to both’.

The false dichotomy of a choice between faith and citizenship is illustrated by another finding of this study. North American Muslims regularly and readily use the civil courts to resolve conflicts over divorce outcomes where they cannot agree a private settlement (which might include elements of both common law and Islamic law, depending on the couple). In other words, Muslims act no differently from others who prefer to settle a family dispute without the cost of lawyers and courts if possible but will use the legal system if necessary. The overwhelming majority of respondents expressed the simple desire to be able to continue to access their Islamic traditions in a private, informal system and to be able to use the legal process to formalise marriage and divorce and where necessary to resolve conflicts.

How do we draw the outline of a common sense of identity between Muslim and non-Muslim societies?

The accounts of hundreds of Muslims demonstrate the mundane normality of their family life and the many similarities between Muslim family customs and beliefs about marriage and divorce and those of others. They describe practices that are typical of displaced or relocated communities, and there are many parallel practices within other religious and cultural communities. The marital conflicts they described were in many respects the same as those seen in other studies of divorce. The most frequent and consistent factor in conflict was changing expectations and values about the role of women, both inside the family and outside the home (in work and in education). Many couples described their struggle with adjusting expectations over gender roles that sometimes became a source of deep (and irresolvable) conflict within the marriage. Despite the frequency of these conflicts, the educational level and professional engagement of Muslim women in North America is higher than that of the general population.

The respondents also described conflicts that reflect the particular nature of Muslim family life, its values and traditions. There was some evidence of continuing polygamist practices, although younger women increasingly reject these. Marriages arranged by parents between children raised in North America and a spouse brought from the family country of origin (so-called trans-national marriages) often failed, causing much sadness. Some Muslim communities that cling to especially patriarchal structures and values are unconscionably tolerant of domestic violence, and there is often pressure on women in these communities to remain in abusive marriages. These and other family issues raise important challenges for the communities and deserve to be taken very seriously by imams and other community leaders. I have set out these issues and questions that they raise in ‘Understanding Trends in Muslims Marriage and Divorce: A Discussion Guide for Families and Communities’.32
How can we develop a notion of citizenship that encompasses diverse layers of identity and belonging?

In his controversial 2007 speech, Archbishop Rowan Williams argued that Muslims in a non-Muslim state have multiple affiliations and identities and that they should not have to choose between cultural identity and citizenship. He warned that presenting British Muslims with a choice between ‘your culture and your rights’ threatened to alienate and ghettoise these communities. This study shows that for Muslims in North America, their lived experience of citizenship reflects their multiple affiliations and layers of identity. Tensions inevitably arise among these—for example, how far to accept a narrow approach to the permissibility of divorce asserted by some religious leaders or to assert a more flexible view of reasons for divorce or whether to limit financial obligations upon divorce to the payment of the mahr or to embrace more contemporary ideas about marital equality and property settlement—but individuals will resolve them.

There is a primitive ignorance that characterises almost every discourse—in the media, among academics, in the classroom and at the dinner tables of family and friends.

Understanding this complex model of modern-day citizenship also requires a nuanced rather than a traditional understanding of what it means to hold a religious faith. What respondents understand as religious principle reflects their formal knowledge but is also integrated with their cultural consciousness, including traditions from their countries of origin and customs within their own family systems. The lines between what they understand to be religiously proscribed and their embedded cultural beliefs are continually blurred. This is consistent with research that points to the changing form of ‘religious practice’ and an increased emphasis on a personal, subjective experience rather than a collective one subject to agreed authorities.

For respondents in this study, the critical benchmark for their personal choices about marriage and divorce was neither religious proscription nor cultural obligations but a ‘recognition of self’ that included their ‘sources of significance’—a means to meet their personal needs (conscience, sense of personal satisfaction, responsibility to their family/community), however they understand these. Just like their fellow citizens, North American Muslims are looking for a model of citizenship that allows them to be full participants without requiring them to abandon any part of that.

— Dr Julie Macfarlane is a professor at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.
INTEGRATION AS INTERACTION

BY NAGIHAN HALILOĞLU

The concept of integration, in the European context, has different resonances to different people: To some, it calls to mind certain co-citizens’ failure to adopt certain ‘European’ ways, and to others, the state pressuring them to abandon certain habits. We need to rethink what integration means and can mean for the European community as a whole.

In his ‘A Muslim Social Contract of Europe’,35 Mustafa Ceric interprets the ayat that enjoins Muslims to be the ummatan wasatan, a term that is usually translated as ‘the community of the middle way’, as a call to Muslims to be an ‘Integrative Community’; that is, ‘a Universal Community in the middle of world affairs which has the active task of connecting, attracting and integrating the immeasurable greatness of the Divine with the immeasurable diversity of the human’. The goal of the Muslim is, therefore, to embody the beauty and grace of the divine in his/her actions in this world as the vice-regent of God and act with mercy towards all creation in its variety. This is how, Ceric advises, Muslims should regard the larger issue of ‘integration’ and not as an issue of how Muslims fail or succeed in conforming to certain norms in Europe.

I cannot stress enough the importance of engaging with the concept of integration through contrapuntal readings. While Ceric looks at the issue in a much more constructive and conceptual way, with a view to providing an important role, a mission, for Muslims in all societies, I have polemical questions as to what the term ‘Muslim integration’ (and, by extension, ‘European values’) means, particularly when uttered by European politicians. Instead of saying, You have these questions, go directly to the heart of the question. I will leave aside the huge geographical question, which requires its own lengthy discussion, but if we assume there is a geographical unity called Europe, the question of ‘European’ still remains. Are people European if their ancestors have been on the continent for four generations? Five? By this polemic, I mean to say we cannot subscribe readily to the assumption that Muslims are somehow a late introduction to the continent. Let us assume that we have settled these problems and have agreed on what ‘European’ means ethnically, and even by way of denomination. That still leaves us with the question of what strand of ‘European Culture’ Muslims, immigrant or otherwise and supposedly members of an alien culture, are to integrate to. Should all Muslims try to learn to play a musical instrument, or maybe be able to hold conversations on the latest multi-million football transfer with their co-citizens?

The way the religious scholars of all faiths have engaged in debate in the past shows that there can be a different, a less essentialising, way to understand ‘difference’.

Maybe there are enough polemics. Maybe some people will be able to point to a few things that are certainly not European—subjugation of women, for instance—as President Sarkozy warned in his 2007 election campaign: ‘Those who want to subjugate their women have nothing to do in France’. There are many rebuttals to this, as to how subjugation of women is not an Islamic practice, but what we see happening in communities that have emigrated from Muslim countries to Europe is a reflection of their country of origin’s traditional gender roles. Gender roles is one thing; subjugation, another. Before observant Muslims (or Jews or Christians for that matter) let out a sigh of relief and lay the fault at the feet of local traditions that date back to before the revelations, I suggest we
consider the possibility that ‘local’ cultures are not geared towards subjugation of women any more than religions are. I suggest that it is always certain individuals interpreting certain written or oral traditions, whether they be religious or ethnic, according to their own aims to oppress others. That is what subjugation is. It is an individual choice of inflicting harm on those who are physically and/or politically weaker than ourselves. We have to stop seeing crimes people visit upon others as ‘communal’ acts and recognise everyone’s individual responsibilities and agency. To recognise that everyone is equally responsible for his or her actions is to recognise that we are all similar on some fundamental level, and this is what is essential for a multicultural society—the recognition that we are similar enough to have shared goals.

The Ottoman millet system, as a functioning multicultural system, is invoked frequently today, and recent research suggests that ‘there was no overall administrative system, structure or set of institutions for dealing with non-Muslims’ but ‘a set of arrangements, largely local, with considerable variation over time and place’: not wholesale solutions but recognising the particularities of each case. That this system of arrangements functioned well in such a multicultural society for such a long time tells us that the sense of justice on the whole, and particularly among the Abrahamic religions, is very comparable.

In fact, the way the religious scholars of all faiths have engaged in debate in the past shows that there can be a different, a less essentialising, way to understand ‘difference’. The polemics written in the Middle Ages by Christians, Jews and Muslims about and against each other’s understanding of the universe and the nature of God, and the benefit to science in general from that discussion, is just one example as to how we can all engage with each other’s traditions. We have to believe that we have enough commonalities, and I am not being an optimist here, to be able to hold a conversation. In that sense, a policy of multiculturalism that dwells on similarities rather than differences, and that allows us a space in which we can share in the experiences of the other, I believe, will be the way forward.

Acknowledging the creative tension that results in ideas and beliefs sharing the same physical discursive space, Rowan Williams reminds us that ‘process drives us all to better self-understanding, to a self-questioning that takes us deeper; it doesn’t lead to compromise or indifferentism’. He thus points to the interactive nature of living in a society, to being open to challenges and engaging in intellectual debate that should hopefully give us a better sense of who we are.

— Nagihan Haliloğlu is assistant professor at the Alliance of Civilisations Institute, Istanbul.
TWO LANGUAGES: REFLECTIONS ON CALIBRATING CITIZENSHIP AND RELIGIO-CULTURAL IDENTITIES

BY FARID PANJWANI

Think of a plural society not as one in which there is Babel of conflicting languages, but rather as one in which we each have to be bilingual. There is a first and public language of citizenship which we have to learn if we are to live together. And there is a variety of second languages which connect us to our local framework of relationship: to family and group and traditions that underlie them.38

Societies flourish by harnessing diversity. But they also need social cohesion. For plural societies to thrive, a dynamic balance between citizenship and cultural identities is thus required. People in such societies need to acquire and practice a language of citizenship and a language of their cultural identities.

In recent years, it is the presence of Muslims in Europe that has been of main concern with regard to calibrating citizenship and cultural identities. This short paper will critically examine one of the assumptions underpinning this concern. This recurring dualistic assumption is around the axis of religion and the secular and is found both in the popular and academic discourses. Accordingly, cultures of the West, European in particular, are secular, and cultures from where Muslims come are religious. Consequently, the presence of Muslims is seen as a challenge both for the West and for the Muslims. An example of this view is found in a book titled European Muslims and the Secular State in which the authors claim that ‘the presence of Muslim communities constitutes a dual challenge: on the one hand, for the Muslims themselves who have to find a means of integrating in a reality (the secular state) that is culturally alien to many of them, and on the other, for the Europeans who have to understand how far the secularity of the state can go to integrate this reality’.39 A study of the portrayal of Muslims in European textbooks shows that the assumption is long-standing and part of Europe’s self-perception.40 A consequence of this is the dominant ‘narrative of inevitable and fundamental conflict between Islam and Muslims and the so-called “Western cultures”’.41

That there is a possible tension between the demands of citizenship and obligations of religion has been recognised widely. It is neither a new issue nor peculiar to Muslims in the West. Examples of this tension can be found across many cultures. Perhaps the most dramatic portrayal is found in Sophocles’ play Antigone where the protagonist Antigone confronts the edict of the city-state based on her obligation to what we today will call her religious belief. The Ashwatthama incident in the Indian epic Mahabharata is yet another example of the literary portrayal of this tension, this time situated in ancient South Asia. Another example is that of mihna in the ninth century CE Baghdad under the Abbasid rule.42 These examples can be supplemented by those closer to our times. The Mozert v. Hawkins case in the US in 1983 involved a complaint by ‘born-again’ Christian families against the local school board about a primary school reading programme that they thought denigrated their religious views simply by exposing children to a variety of points of view. The point to note is that the tensions between ‘obligations of citizenship and demands of faith’ are not restricted to Muslims and the West even though in recent years the question has been discussed mostly with reference to Islam and Muslims.43
The problem with such narratives of conflict is not that no tension is possible between citizenship and religio-cultural identities. It is certainly possible. The problem is that such narratives take what is merely contingent and possible and portray it as inevitable and part of the essence of people and their cultures. Identities are assumed to be fixed and incompatible. In the case we are dealing with, this means believing that Islam and Muslim identity as well as the West have unchangeable and conflicting essences.

Undoubtedly, religion remains a source of existential symbols around which life in Muslim societies is oriented and social actions acquire meaning. But, particularly in the modern period, religion is no longer the only source of such symbols and values. Contemporary cultures of Muslims are a mix of religious and secular attitudes, approaches, orientations, desires and trends. Most Muslims live in what Martin Marty calls ‘our Religio-Secular world’.44 Examples of secularity can be found at the level of the state (Turkey, Tunisia, Syria, Mali and others) as well as that of civil society.45

One of the most important educational tasks (in the broad sense of the word) ahead of us is to displace the assumption of fixed identities not only because of its undesirable consequences but also because it is historically and sociologically inaccurate. Both what are called the western and Muslim cultures are historically contingent realities. Both are dynamic, internally diverse and interpretive. This task can be carried out by good historical representation in media and in schools. It can also be aided by sound sociological and anthropological studies. Once it is realised that cultures are not eternally fixed in their identities but carry elements of change and transformation, new possibilities emerge. For instance, it can help replace the current perception of the West as secular and Muslim cultures as religious with a more apt portrayal of both as ‘religio-secular’.46

So far, I have been (deliberatively) using the terms Muslims and the West in an essentialised manner, as if these terms refer to homogenous and undifferentiated people or cultures. In fact, this ‘slip’ often happens. In order to respond to the narrative of conflict, one applies the same categories as postulated by that narrative, thereby perpetuating the problem. In doing so, one neglects and marginalises millions of people who are Muslim and western without any internal contradiction and conflict. These include many Muslims who have migrated to the West and made it their home. And it also includes many western people who have converted to Islam and made it a part of their identity. The presence of such people is a very strong, perhaps fatal, criticism of this conflict narrative. It points to the need for revisiting the very categories in which the narrative is articulated and responded. It is thus not sufficient to simply point out Muslim contributions to the West and the anecdotes of peaceful co-existence, because such well-intentioned responses often work with the same dichotomies that are assumed in the conflict-based narrative.

In short, both the inherited cultural identities and the received notions of citizenship will have to be recast to supplement each other if the confusion of Babel is to be avoided.

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The religious turn or: Why do we always speak about religion?
Throughout Western Europe these days, certain topics bring up the Islam question or the question of the return of religion into the public sphere. However, I would argue that often, discussions do not actually address issues of religion when the words Islam, Islamic and Muslim garnish the conversation. Often, we end up speaking about citizenship, about neighbourhoods, about crime, the future of the youth, political participation and mostly the image of the self, of a nation, of Europe, the Western hemisphere or western values. The (other) religion that is allegedly the core issue is often just a mirror that serves as the counterpart to how the beautiful self is imagined, the ideal European society with equality between men and women, freedom of religion and lifestyle, tolerance towards sexual orientation and equal treatment of racialised and ethnicised individuals and communities. The aforementioned not only become invoked values that claim to portray a consensus in European democracies, but often are not followed sincerely by those who ask so-called newcomers to subscribe to these values.47

Let us look at gender equality as an example: Especially conservative politicians, who for decades refused to engage in discussions on issues of gender equality, now present themselves as saviours and pedagogues of liberal gender norms towards Muslims, which are correspondingly portrayed as backward. While speaking of the Muslim woman’s suffering, however, women’s suffering is not addressed.48,49 Even victims of domestic violence and oppression in Muslim families are not always helped by the activities undertaken in their name.50 Simultaneously, those who demand gender equality within Muslim communities mostly shy away from addressing deficits concerning gender equality in ‘western’ societies like different payment of women for the same work; of forced prostitution and trafficking; or structural exclusion of women from leading positions in academia, economy and politics. This leads to a reformulation of the main challenges concerning gender equality in which discrepancies between men and women within the dominant society are proclaimed minor discrepancies in relation to the main difference of culture. This way, the focus on the oppression of Muslim women is (mis)used to preserve the status quo.51

Assumptions and figurations of anti-Muslim discourse
With this observation, I suggest that it is necessary to take a closer look at the underlying assumptions and figurations of anti-Muslim discourse and of narratives that imagine and invoke a Europe without Islam and Muslims. Instead of automatically rejecting, correcting and thereby submitting to the premise of this discourse that religion is the issue, I want to advocate for a further reflection about the different identity politics involved in this debate and departing from this reflection develop effective counter-narratives. Such a narrative needs to not only counter the expressions of such narratives but also change the discourse, its rules, the guiding themes, and widen the circle of the actors involved in it.

In the following, I want to shortly present three observations I made analysing different strands of discourse about Islam and Muslims in Europe, with a special focus on Germany.

Muslims are the problem
The constant focus on Islam and Muslims, even if set with the aim to correct negative stereotypes, contributes both to the production of Muslim subject positions and the ascription of individuals with Islam. Consequently, individuals of Muslim background can hardly access public voice without speaking as Muslims. This means that
even well-meant initiatives that invite Muslim men and women, youth and professionals etc. are conducive to Muslim identities and thereby further the notion of an existence of separate communities that run along the lines of being Muslim or not. In academia, this process has been described as the Islamisation of individuals and debates or the generation of Muslim subjects. It not only contributes to the ascription of Muslim identities that can be paralysing and empowering at the same time. It also promotes the imagination of a ‘majority’ as particularly characterised by its being Non-Muslim and hence glosses over differences and disagreements among this thereby constructed ‘majority’. Such a focus moreover excludes the participation of other minorities and therefore can by its nature not succeed in developing a notion of citizenship that encompasses diverse layers of identity and belonging as asked for in question number 4.

Imagining the ‘actual’ Islam and the ‘actual’ Europe

When Safet Bectovic published a book on five Muslim philosophers earlier this year in Denmark, the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten published a review that concludes, ‘[T]he weakness of the book [. . .] is that it is not about the actually existing Islam. It is based on an imagined and idealised version [. . .]’. The nice stories of moderate Islam he presented were just not the ‘real’ Islam. He was accused of glossing over the nasty aspects and presenting only exceptions, and most of the review was used to explain how ugly the ‘actual’ Islam was. Whenever positive examples, stories and individuals of Muslim provenience are presented in the public debate, they seem to support rather than to disturb anti-Muslim narratives. It seems crucial to understand how this works. And I find the concept of the semantics of the actual (Semantik des Eigentlichen), which the German philosopher Heiner Bielefeldt applied to the discourse on Islam, very useful. Whatever is presented in counter-narratives to show a differentiated picture tends to be neatly fitted into the image of ‘real’ Islam, which in its essence and core is claimed to be violent, anti-liberal and misogynist. With this figuration, moderate, successful and integrated Muslims can be easily portrayed as either skilful deceptions or exceptions. An example of this is the media perception of the mixed gender prayer led by Amina Wadud in 2005. In Germany, the idea that women could—according to ‘proper’ Islam—not lead prayers or teach Imams was introduced into the public debate only then. Those who supported the stereotype of the misogynist Islam were quoted as opinion leaders and ‘real’ interpreters of Islam, and therefore, the picture of the ‘real’ Islam remained untouched or was even affirmed. Amina Wadud became a symbolic figure, portrayed as a victim of patriarchal Islamic scholars.

If religion is not the issue of many of the debates that are circling around Muslims and an Islamic presence in Europe or the US, should we engage in and contribute to debates that maintain that this is the crucial problem?

As a result, Muslims frequently experience that either their liberalism or belonging to a European state or their Islamic identity is questioned. Often in an implicit (but sometimes in a very explicit) way, it is assumed that the ‘liberal’ attitude or ‘integrated’ lifestyle of a Muslim must be doubtful or potentially endangered, or the Muslim is suspected of not being a ‘real’ Muslim. Any other Muslim needs to be described as not anti-liberal (i.e. moderate, liberal or progressive) or his or her Muslimness is highlighted, while the norm, the ‘actual’ Islam, is portrayed as being embodied by the Taliban or preachers from Saudi Arabia. Only ‘extremist’ or at least ‘conservative’ Muslims, recognisable as anti-liberal according to the figuration of the liberal in this context, are accepted as ‘real’ representatives of Islam.

The counter-image to the ‘actual’ Islam is the ‘actual’ Europe, Germany or France etc., which implies that these societies have achieved gender justice; democratic participation of all citizens; equal treatment of religious, racialised or ethnicised minorities and consequently do not need to engage any longer in substantial discussions for instance about gender inequality within dominant structures. This seems to be a main function of the discursive ‘actual’ Islam, to
cover up deficiencies with respect to values that are largely presented as universal and European; for instance, to cover up the on-going exclusion of women in European societies from positions of decision making.

Therefore, even the most positive and convincing presentation of Islam or Muslims or their contribution to present societies will not change the basic assumptions of the ‘actual’ Islam. This discursive figure is able to re-establish the image of Islam by selectively calling any unfitting cases exceptions or simply not true. The core of the image of Islam as incompatible is not touched but even strengthened with every positive individual or example that is presented.

Claiming the irrelevance of religion while focusing on Muslims
Finally, we see ourselves confronted with a dilemma that has been discussed in depth in the context of affirmative action. It is the problem that in order to raise awareness of the discrimination or exclusion of a certain category in a society, this very category, as injuring and demeaning as it might be, needs to be taken up by those who counter it. The dilemma is that by doing this, one also unavoidably strengthens the terminology, at least for a time. Should we ignore the terms that are used to categorise, demonise and discriminate individuals and communities and along which societies are being divided or take them up to counter them? If religion is not the issue of many of the debates that are circling around Muslims and an Islamic presence in Europe or the US, should we engage in and contribute to debates that maintain that this is the crucial problem? Is it at all possible to demonstrate the irrelevance of certain categories (like here Muslim vs. non-Muslim) while taking them up and giving them importance by framing the outline of a common sense of identity? Before we exchange good stories and examples, I therefore want to ask, Can positive stories about Islam and Muslims be effective at all against the dominant centuries-old discourse that portrays both as violent, anti-liberal and utterly strange?

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QUESTIONS REGARDING THE IDENTITY AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION OF MUSLIMS IN GERMANY

By Prof. Dr Havva Engin

Within the last decades, a number of important works and investigations about Muslim migrants were done as a result of migration and immigration to Germany.

45%

German Citizenship

The data shows that there are between 3.7 million and 4.3 million Muslims from almost fifty different countries living in Germany, about 5% of the total German population. Almost half of the Muslims (45%) have German citizenship.

Turkish immigrants are the largest Muslim group in Germany; they account for 60% of the Muslim population, followed by Muslims from Southern Europe (13%) as well as from the Middle East (8%).

The distribution of Muslims to various Islamic groups

The religious profile of the Muslim population in Germany corresponds to the approximate global distribution of the different Islamic sects: The Sunnis form the largest group with two thirds, followed by the Alevi group with 13% and the Shi’a group with 7%.

Rate of religiousness

Current German studies confirm that Muslims, in comparison with Christians, present with religious consciousness levels that are twice as high. Of all Muslims, 41% describe themselves as very religious (49% as religious). Among the Christians, however, 14% describe themselves as very religious (52% as religious).

Integration through education

The distribution of education certificates among the different Muslim immigrant groups shows the history of German migrants. Therefore, immigrant groups that were either recruited for work purposes, i.e. the so-called guest/foreign workers, or came as war refugees into the country have low education degrees.

If one compares the standard of education of the first (guest/foreign workers) generation with that of the second generation, then it is apparent (as in the case of Muslims of the second generation from Southern Europe) that there is a significant improvement in the education situation of the second and third generations.

Proof of a peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Germans can be seen in the rate of memberships in German organisations, but in many cities segregation exists between immigrants and natives.

According to the education degrees brought or attained in Germany, Muslims are placed in different occupational groups. Due to the low education level of the predominant number of Muslims, the majority are working as labourers. Only a very small proportion of them work as
officials. These are found exclusively among Muslim immigrants from the Middle East.

If the integration into the labour market is viewed from a gender perspective, then it turns out that the number of employed Muslim women is significantly lower; they are more likely to be entrusted with housework and childrearing. The employment rate among Muslim women is about 35%–40% of the total female Muslim population.

Recent studies show the huge number of Muslims who want to participate in social life. The percentage of those who say that they never have contact with Germans is (including all groups) far less than 10%. Hence, almost two-thirds (69.1%) of Muslims accept Germany as their new homeland.

Contacts at work, depending on the place of work, are very high; more than 80% claim to care about regular contact. There are also active contacts with Germans in the neighbourhoods. Proof of a peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Germans can be seen in the rate of memberships in German organisations, which is over 50% among Muslims.

Questions regarding inter-religious openness contradict the debates around integration into the Christian German society. Of the Muslim people, 80% say that they would accept a possible inter-religious marriage of their sons; 66% say that they would accept an inter-religious marriage of their daughters.

**Outlook**

Germany has become the new homeland for a large number of Muslims who have not had to cut their roots to their country of origin. Many of them represent a new type of transnational and transcultural citizen.

The results show that the rate of integration into German society depends on issues of education and integration into the labour market—not the religious identity of Muslims.

It is also a fact that in many cities in Germany, segregation exists between immigrants and natives. In the future, this separation should be defeated with the help of social planning and local initiatives, such as district/neighbourhood management.

Regarding the younger generations, the setup of an inter-faith dialogue at eye-level is needed. This will help to increase their identification with German society and its way of life.

In conclusion, consider the following quote from Haug, Muessig and Stichs: ‘Islam isn’t the problem even if many young Muslims struggle with heavy problems. The religiousness [...] should be therefore used as a resource for the integration process and not understood as a barrier for the incorporation of the Muslims in Germany’.60,61

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HOW DO WE BREAK DOWN THE MONOLITHIC VIEW OF ISLAM THAT OFTEN DOMINATES MEDIA COVERAGE? A LITTLE HUMOUR GOES A LONG WAY, AND STORIES OF ORDINARY INDIVIDUALS CREATING CHANGE CAN HAVE EXTRAORDINARY IMPACT.
ENDNOTES


3. A stirring and timely appeal for Britain to acknowledge its colonial past comes from George Monbiot in the *Guardian*, April 24, 2012.


5. The history and achievements of each group is briefly traced in a separate paper to be presented at a forthcoming conference in Konya, Turkey, in April 2012.


15. Banting and Kymlicka (2006); Akan (2003); Barry (2001a, 2001b); Kelly (2002); Taylor (1994); Joppke and Lukes (1999)

16. Both Manchester and Sheffield contain areas of relatively high deprivation (http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/indices-multiple-deprivation-poverty-england), though Manchester ranks higher than Sheffield in poverty and other indices. For the purposes of this paper, the areas where the research was conducted, Bury and Salford in Manchester and Darnall and Burngreaves in Sheffield, rank amongst the poorest areas in both of the cities, with Salford in the top twenty deprived areas in the country. See also [http://www.sheffield.nhs.uk/healthdata/resources/imd2010.pdf](http://www.sheffield.nhs.uk/healthdata/resources/imd2010.pdf)


22. Ibid.


30. See Jamal Zahra, “‘Work no Words’: Voluntarism, Subjectivity, and Moral Economies of Exchange among Khoja Isma’ili Muslims” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008)
42. In the ninth century CE, Baghdad, the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mun (d.833) initiated mihnah, often translated as inquisition, requiring government officials to publicly declare that the Qur’an was created in time. This act meant greater leeway to the caliph in the exercise of his political authority. Many Muslim scholars understandably opposed it, arguing that the Qur’an was an uncreated and eternal word of God. Some years later, the caliphal stance was reversed under the reign of another caliph, al-Mutawakkil.
43. Due to its context, the present write-up focuses on Muslims in the West and the discourse around them. However, it is important to note that the conflict-based narrative is also a regular feature of some Muslim contexts. There are many Muslims who believe and talk about an inevitable conflict between Islam and the West. This fact is often missed out. And sometimes when it is acknowledged, it is diluted by saying that only a handful of misguided Muslims have this approach. No such diluting interpretation is given to the western discourse. Hence, the two-sidedness of this conflict-laden imagery and discourse needs to be acknowledged.
46. This educational task is required both in Europe and in Muslim societies. Please see note 2 above as well.
47. A good example of such a debate is the Squared Intelligence debate with Tariq Ramadan, Fleming Rose and Petra Steinen and co-organized by the British Council. ‘Europe is failing its Muslims’ that was arranged by the Intelligence Squared, a global forum for live debate, according to their self-description ‘dedicated to creating knowledge through contest’ in joint cooperation with the British Council and BBC. The debate took place on February 23, 2010, at Cadogan Hall in London in front of a large audience and was distributed by online streaming and BBC World News, last accessed January 27, 2012, http://www.intelligencesquared.com/events/europe-muslims
50. As Gökce Yurdakul and Anne Korteweg demonstrate, debates about honour killings and forced marriages in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany have led to very different policies. In some cases, they have served as legitimation to further limit immigration. They also present cases of policies from the Netherlands and Canada that counter violence against Muslim women in an effective way. See Gökce Yurdakul and Anne Korteweg, Politicization of Honour-Related Violence, 2010.
57. Bielefeldt, Das Islambild in Deutschland, (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, 2008).
59. Lamya Kaddor, co-founder of the Liberal-Islamic Association, observes a noteworthy coalition between Muslim extremists and ‘Islam critics,’ who both attack persons that advocate interpretations of Islam that are compatible with democracy and changes in their own midst. ‘In a remarkable intellectual fraternity
they are supported by so-called ‘Islam critics,’ who are eager for Islam to keep its fundamentalist and reactionary outlook. Progressive Muslims are then labeled either as hypocrites, who do not treat the Islamic tradition truthfully, or as helpless voices in the wilderness. The dogma that principally Islam is not to be integrated must not be shaken’. In: Lamya Kaddor, trans., “Warum es mich nicht geben darf,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 28, 2010.


